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org/licenses/by/4.0/).individual differences observed in typical and atypical pop-
ulations. In recognition of this problem, attempts have beeninteroception in emotion understanding (Seth, 2013), but
Ondobaka and colleagues (Ondobaka et al., 2017) propose that,Theory of Mind (ToM) is traditionally characterized as the
ability to represent mental states. Such a characterization
leaves little room for studying individual differences in ToM e
individuals either can, or cannot, represent mental states e
and this binary classification cannot quantify the subtlehology, Anglia Ruskin Un
(P. Shah).
Elsevier Ltd. This is an opemade to provide a more detailed characterization of the con-
stituent psychological processes which support the repre-
sentation of mental states (Happe, Cook, & Bird, 2017;
Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015), and the neuro-
computational principles underpinning ToM (Koster-Hale &
Saxe, 2013), in order to identify the source of individual dif-
ferences. A recent model is of interest as it forwards the novel
argument that interoception, perception of the internal state
of the body, is a fundamental component of ToM (Ondobaka,
Kilner, & Friston, 2017). Here we report the first test of the
link between interoception and ToM.
Ondobaka, Kilner and Friston's model (Ondobaka et al.,
2017) draws on the ‘Predictive Coding’ framework, in which
the brain generates hypotheses about the world and tests
their predictive validity against incoming sensory evidence.
Several models within this framework argue for a role for
as emotional and other interoceptive states (e.g., hunger)
constrain hypotheses about an individual's mental states,
interoception plays a fundamental role in ToM. Strong and
weak versions of this hypothesis can be constructed, where
the weak version suggests that emotional and other intero-
ceptive states provide evidence to form or evaluate hypothe-
ses about another's mental state. The strong version of theiversity, Cambridge, CB1 1PT, United Kingdom.
n access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
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for the representation of mental states e the defining feature
of ToM. We therefore tested whether interoceptive accuracy
predicted performance on the representation of mental states
in general, or only in those situations where understanding
emotion was crucial for accurate mental state representation.
Seventy-two participants completed a well-established
measure of interoception in which they counted their heart-
beats during intervals of varying duration (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). They were not allowed to monitor
their pulse by any means other than “silently concentrating
on their heartbeats”. Each participant's heartbeat signals
were recorded and, through comparison with their count,Fig. 1 e The link between interoception, emotion, and theory of
(MASC) was administered (Dziobek et al., 2006), in which partic
divided into short clips. After viewing each clip, they were presen
the mental state of one character. Only one of four answers wa
emotional (e.g., “What is Sandra feeling?”) and non-emotional (e
accuracy was positively correlated with overall MASC score (rs¼
between interoception and emotional items (rs ¼ .41, P < .001,
between interoception and the non-emotional items (rs ¼ .03, P
significantly different (z ¼ 2.38, P ¼ .017).interoceptive accuracy was computed [see (Garfinkel, Seth,
Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015)]. Performance on this task
may be influenced by one's ability to estimate time or count,
so this was controlled for by measuring participants' ability to
estimate time intervals of varying duration (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures e Interoception and Time Estima-
tion). Participants completed the Movie for the Assessment of
Social Cognition (MASC), a well-validated measure of ToM
[(Dziobek et al., 2006); see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures], which required them to watch a social event in
which accurate mental state inferences are needed to un-
derstand the story (Fig. 1A). The video was inter-
spersed with multiple-choice questions probing mental statemind. (A) The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition
ipants watched a 15-min movie about a social interaction
ted with amultiple choice question requiring them to infer
s correct. Performance was quantified separately for
.g., “What is Michael thinking?”) questions. (B) Interoceptive
.31, P¼ .008, left panel), driven by a significant association
middle panel). However, there was no such association
¼ .80, right panel) and the two correlations were
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score was derived. Accuracy was also computed for a set of
nonsocial control questions (e.g., “What was the weather like
on that evening?”). Most importantly, performance was
quantified separately for questions which required represen-
tation of another's emotion (e.g., “What is Sandra feeling?”),
and for those which did not require the representation of
emotional states (e.g., “What is Michael thinking?”).
Greater interoceptive accuracy was associated with overall
MASC score (rs ¼ .31, P ¼ .008). Importantly, however, there
was only a significant association between interoception and
performance on items requiring the representation of an-
other's emotion (rs¼ .41, P < .001), not where representation of
emotional states was not required (rs¼ .03, P¼ .80). The size of
these correlations was significantly different (z ¼ 2.38,
P ¼ .017). This pattern of results (Fig. 1B) was supported by a
Bayesian analysis and held after controlling for participants'
age, gender, task completion time, time estimation ability and
their performance on control questions (Supplemental Tables
S1eS5).
Considerable efforts have been made to understand the
biological basis of ToM, culminating in a wealth of data. There
is also on-going debate about whether human and non-
human animals have evolved a domain-specific module to
represent mental states, or whether this process may be
underpinned by domain-general mechanisms (Heyes, 2014).
As long as the psychological and neural mechanisms sup-
porting ToM are still to be determined such debate will
continue. Understanding the neurocomputational principles
supporting ToM is likely to provide a step-change in our ability
to address these issues, and Predictive Coding models sug-
gesting that interoception plays a role in social abilities
contribute to this endeavor (Happe et al., 2017; Koster-Hale &
Saxe, 2013; Ondobaka et al., 2017; Seth, 2013). The current
results suggest that interoception is not necessary for the
representation of mental states per se, however it contributes
to accurate representation of mental states in situations
where this process is reliant upon emotional, or otherwise
interoceptive, information. It was also notable that perfor-
mance on emotional questions (M ¼ 70.53, SD ¼ 11.56) was
significantly (t ¼ 7.41, P < .001, d ¼ .06) worse than on non-
emotional questions (M ¼ 81.21, SD ¼ 9.76), which may be
due to the fact that emotional ToM requires processing of
additional interoceptive information.
The current results are supported by evidence that insular
cortex, known to be critical for generating interoceptive
predictions, is a reliable neural correlate of affective pro-
cessing (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Seth, 2013; Zaki, Davis, &
Ochsner, 2012). The findings are also in accordance with
recent work showing that alexithymia, a condition charac-
terized by interoceptive atypicalities (Hogeveen, Bird, Chau,
Krueger, & Grafman, 2016; Livingston & Livingston, 2016;
Shah, Catmur, & Bird, 2016; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird,
2016), predicted performance on a task requiring emotional
understanding but not on a task assessing non-emotional
ToM, whereas Autism Spectrum Disorder, which is associ-
ated with ToM but not interoceptive deficits, predicted per-
formance on tests of ToM but not emotion understanding
(Oakley, Brewer, Bird, & Catmur, 2016). Nonetheless, wesuggest that interoceptive training may have a beneficial
impact in the real world, where an improved ability to
represent the interoceptive/emotional states of oneself and
of others is likely to result in more accurate mental state
inferences, and benefit emotional understanding more
generally.
In sum, this study reports the first empirical test of Pre-
dictive Coding models of the contribution of interoception to
ToM, and thereby i) speaks to the psychological and compu-
tational underpinnings of ToM and ii) provides impetus for
future research on the basis of (atypical) ToM and related so-
cial abilities.
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